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Contemplating the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina gives us an excellent opportunity to 
evaluate the ‘state of the art’ of contemporary social theory. What could social theory 
contribute to enhance our understanding of what happened before, during and after 
the events which are best described as ‘a disaster’. 
 
Social theory, at least the variant which has dominated the Euro-American academy 
since the erosion of the disciplinary strongholds within the social sciences, has 
concerned itself in the recent past with analyses of a host of phenomena which could, 
theoretically at least, have some relevance to explaining why things turned out the 
way they did. One could, for example, deploy risk theory to reflect on the way in 
which the disaster had been anticipated and how crucial decisions, affecting the lives 
of thousands of people were made (or not). We could go into more detail and deploy 
Actor Network Theory, for example, to map the various links and translations that 
took place between the initial forecasts of the experts and the eventual forms of 
disaster management that were put in place (or not). We could resort to analyses of 
capitalism, to reflect on the way in which crucial decisions relating to the flood 
defences, and the subsequent deployment of security forces, seemed to emphasise the 
short term interests of capital accumulation over longer term interests of social 
stability, or, to put it another way, the value of property over that of human life. The 
latter could be further enlightened by deploying the concept of racism as a means to 
explain why exactly those sections of New Orleans were most abandoned and people 
left to fend for themselves where there was the largest concentration of African 
Americans. Finally, we could deploy more generic social theoretical concepts such as 
individualization and the breakdown of social integration to analyse how in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans gave us a glimpse of what a post-
apocalypse urban waste-land might look like.  
 
Yet, we suspect that by and large, the vestiges of social theory, as they are harboured 
by the prestigious publishers’ series of monographs, international journals and 
conferences, will leave this disaster undiscussed, just as they had no particular interest 
in discussing the Tsunami of December 2004. This is because, by and large, social 
theory as an institution is ill-equipped to deal with matters that are of real relevance. 
Social theory lacks a sense of urgency because it is institutionally produced by people 
who use institutions to escape the kinds of economic vulnerability that are the 
condition of the majority in an America, and Britain, forcibly shaped by the same 
neoliberal economic project for the best part of twenty-five years.  The diagnosis of 
the cultural effects of an economics used for political interests, is clear in the 
following: 
 
Supporters of laisser-faire, like Thatcher, Reagan and their successors, are careful in practice not to 
‘laisser faire’ but, on the contrary, to leave a free hand to the logic of financial markets by waging 
total war on trade unions, on the social achievements of the last couple of centuries, in a word 
against all the forms of civilization associated with the social state…Neoliberal policy can now be 
judged by its results, which are clear for all to see, despite systematic efforts to prove, through 
statistical sleight of hand and gross trickery, that the United States or Britain has achieved full 
employment.  There is mass unemployment; what jobs there are have become precarious, the 
resulting permanent insecurity affecting an increasing proportion of the population, even in the 
middle classes; there is profound demoralization linked to the collapse of elementary solidarities, 
especially in the family, and all the consequences of this state of anomie: juvenile delinquency, 
crime, drugs, alcoholism, the reappearance in France and elsewhere of fascist-style political 
movements; and there is the gradual destruction of the economic and social foundations of 
humanity’s rarest cultural achievements. (Bourdieu 1998: 126-127).   
 
“The movement toward the neoliberal utopia of a pure and perfect market” (Bourdieu 
1998b: 2) was the vehicle through which those whose interests it expressed, 
stockholders, financial operators, industrialists, conservative or social-democratic 
politicians, high-level financial officials (Bourdieu 1998b: 2), reclaimed what had 
been conceded in the post-war consensus.  Neoliberal economics, is not the 
expression of an economic inevitability but of a political will (Bourdieu 1998b: 85) 
that emerges from the constitution of the public realm by the State nobility.  Thus, the 
economic policies productive of inequalities are “part of a mode of domination of a 
new kind, based on the creation of a generalized and permanent state of insecurity 
aimed at forcing an acceptance of exploitation” (Bourdieu 1998b: 86).  By eroding the 
elementary solidarities of the work-place and instituting conditions of economic 
insecurity, it eroded not only the capacity to earn a living and provide for others but 
the very basis of identity and the source of reasons for being and justifications for 
existing, so that it is hardly surprising that lacking stable patterns of access to 
recognised forms of association the working class have become less solidaristic and 
more atomised, precisely the relational conditions neoliberalism aimed to bring about: 
 
One’r things that happened in’ seventies an’ eighties, Thatcher had to divide an rule, shi’ had to, to 
brek power of unions, brek up communities.  So, instead’r people being closer cos ‘r arh ‘ard it is, 
everyone’s separate, thi’s different education, different trainin’, no steady jobs, everybody’s 
separated, the’re wary nahr…nahr thi’ve brought in individuality, fact of bein’ alone, even wi’ 
your neighbors your in competition. 
 
Part of the purpose of neoliberal economics was to undermine the foundations of the 
interpersonal forms of collective decency that once characterized the occupational 
community, the solidaristic dispositions of industrial production and trade Labourism. 
These conditions have had a profound effect on the sociality of those who are 
insecure, creating the interpersonal conditions for the kinds of anonymous violence, 
against self and others, manifest in the figures on violence and mental ill-health.  The 
neoliberal project aims to realize the social conditions for, a world in which 
competition produces a struggle of all against all and violence and cynicism appear to 
be necessities.  One of the striking features of the tragedy in New Orleans was the 
immobilisation of the victims of the neoliberal economic order.  They lacked the 
resources to adequately respond themselves, and they lacked the public value to have 
resources mobilised for them, but, even more significantly, they were immobilised in 
their localities by the nature of their own dispositions: many preferred to stay in a 
locality in imminent danger not merely because of the distances constitutive of 
‘expert’ scientific opinion but because they felt a security in the impoverishment of 
their own locality.  It is a paradox of the labour market discrimination constitutive of 
such disclocated populations that ‘members’ of such fractured groups feel the only 
security or value they have is by remaining within the confines of what they are 
confined to.   
  It is the personal detail of the consequences of this institutionally, economically, 
organised confinement, that it is difficult to get contemporary social science to 
address.  A central aspect of this problem is that the universities themselves are a 
central mediating institution of the contemporary class structure.  In the UK, 
unemployment has been progressively hidden by an extension of university education 
that benefits the petit-bourgeois intelligentsia administering access to the cultural 
tokens, heavily signified certificates, that mediate access to an institutionalised 
economy.  In both the US and the UK the universities are key sites of institutional 
processing that mediate economic access: they are the institutions that secure the 
means of escape from locality: they ensure those paid for ‘teaching’ in them do not 
have to face the economic vulnerability that leaves them without space of movement.  
Galbraith makes an excellent point, when he writes:   
 
What is not accepted, and indeed is little mentioned, is that the underclass is integrally a part of a 
larger economic process and, more importantly, that it serves the living standard and the comfort 
of the more favoured community.  Economic progress would be far more uncertain and certainly 
far less rapid without it.  The economically fortunate, not excluding those who speak with greatest 
regret of the existence of this class, are heavily dependent on its presence. 
  The underclass is deeply functional; all industrial countries have one in greater or lesser measure 
and in one form or another…The picture of an economic and political system in which social 
exclusion, however unforgiving, is somehow a remediable affliction is all but required.  Here, in 
highly compelling fashion, the social convenience of the contented replaces the clearly visible 
reality.  (Galbraith 32-34). 
 
In reality, the contented earn a living producing, for their social convenience, the 
invisibility of the consequences of their social and institutional games: they live 
producing representations that function within their international-institutional 
networks forms of vision, representations, that provide them with the illusion of their 
social importance and their concern.  This is why so much of the everyday, very 
ordinary, banal suffering of the world’s poor go un-evidenced and un-remarked upon: 
ethnography is shunned, evidence is unnecessary and explanation an illusion 
constituted amidst this collective constitution of an illusory discursive field that serves 
the institutional interests, the needs of those instituting this field as a resource.  Social 
science is institutionally anchored in largely self-referential discourses that emerge 
from the safe and privileged life-worlds of its middle class academic protagonists. 
 
It isn’t merely that Social theorists have had very little interest in apocalyptic 
phenomena that have already happened long before, but that they exhibit precious 
little interest in the mundane detail of a rapidly changing social world such that it 
takes a massive and terrible disaster like the one in New Orleans to make present for 
them the fact that the poor exist and live lives utterly alien to that of the people who 
live on university campuses.  Because academics generate careers through their 
institutional networks, there primary access to spatially distant realities tends to be 
representations produced by others.  Both of us are part of a generation in the UK for 
whom access to higher degrees came down to money.  We have both witnessed the 
extent to which access to the credentials to contest social science comes down to 
being able to afford to pay for and fund seven years of study.  Those in social science 
are not socially representative of the earth’s population and they constitute culture in 
order to deliberately avoid the living conditions of those they exclude.  It is a point 
Lasch makes well: 
 
Blind to their own prejudices, the children of light could not see that their own world was in many 
ways just as narrowly circumscribed as the worker’s.  If the worker spent his days in the company 
of “people very like himself,” so did the educated classes.  Their travels took them around the 
globe, but the internationalization of the professional and managerial mode of life meant that they 
encountered the same kind of people and the same living conditions everywhere they went: the 
same hotels, the same three-star restaurants, the same conference rooms and lecture halls.  
Education gave them vicarious access to the world’s culture, but their acquaintance with culture 
was increasingly selective and fragmentary, and it did not seem to have strengthened the capacity 
for imaginative identification with experience alien to their own.  Their educated jargon had lost 
touch with everyday spoken language and no longer served as a repository of the community’s 
common sense.  Academic discourse had achieved a certain analytical precision, in law and 
medicine and the hard sciences, at the expense of vividness and evocative power; while in fields 
like psychiatry, sociology, and social work, it merely distinguished insiders from outsiders and 
gave an air of scientific prestige to practices embarrassed by their homely origins.  Academic 
English–the abstract, uninflected, colorless medium not only of the classroom but of the 
boardroom, the clinic, the court of law, and the governmental bureau–had discarded most of the 
earthly idioms that betrayed its provincial Anglo-Saxon past, and the spoken form of this English 
no longer betrayed any hint of regional accent or dialect.  The bureaucratization of language 
indicated what was happening to intellectual culture as a whole: its transformation into a universal 
medium in a curious way seemed to weaken its capacity to promote public communication.  The 
people who stood at the forefront of the “communications age” had lost the ability to communicate 
with anyone but themselves.  Their technical jargons were unintelligible to outsiders but 
immediately recognizable, as the badge of professional status, to fellow specialists all over the 
world.  The cosmopolitanism of the educated specialists overcame the old barriers of local, 
regional, and even national identity but insulated them from ordinary people and ordinary human 
experience.  Priding themselves on the global reach of their culture, the educated classes led what 
was in many ways a constricted, insular life.  Modern conveniences sheltered them from everyday 
discomforts...Exemption from manual labor deprived them of any appreciation of the practical 
skills it requires or the kind of knowledge that grows directly out of firsthand experience.  (Lasch 
1991: 466-467.) 
 
Their poor “capacity for imaginative identification with experience alien to their own” 
(Lasch 1991: 466) is attendant on their elevation of their own forms to the status of 
nationally recognisable form of excellence, part of the symbolic power through which 
they generate the realm of their own competence in such a way that it is necessarily 
tied to their own forms and thus endlessly inflectable and contestable if ever language 
does fall into the mouths of those who should not be possessed of its signifying 
power.  Such that their blindness is part of the generation of the protected spaces 
through which they dignify themselves and make possible the vanities of their 
expertise.  The inadequacy of their attempts to grasp human reality is tied to the 
embodied institutional procedures through which they instantiate their forms as 
professional forms and Lasch is right to say that “Academic discourse…in fields like 
psychiatry, sociology, and social work…merely distinguished insiders from outsiders 
and gave an air of scientific prestige to practices embarrassed by their homely 
origins.” (Lasch 1991: 466).  Academics co-produce what they want, the pleasures of 
elitism, the pleasures of inner-circles, of being consecrated and recognised and it is 
attendant on multiplicities of exclusion, and the forms of their discourse, in fields 
lacking clear criteria of assessment, produce what they need, what Lasch describes is 
not accidental but necessary, they wanted to frame authorised languages that were 
“unintelligible to outsiders but immediately recognizable, as the badge of professional 
status, to fellow specialists all over the world.”  (Lasch 1991: 467)  They wanted to 
escape the “old barriers of local, regional, and even national identity” (Lasch 1991: 
467) and constitute the “cosmopolitanism of the educated”  (Lasch 1991: 467). 
  The problem is that their cultural constitution of the symbolic tokens they need to 
dominate particular economic sectors has regionalising effects and unfortunately, 
despite what they secretly like to think, they are not Gods, free to survey the world 
sub specie aeternitatis, they cannot access the personal detail of lives constituted from 
a differential relation to the public value they institutionally produce.  Moreover, the 
neo-liberal restructuration of capitalist social formations has had catastrophic 
consequences for entire sections of the population who in a short time lost not only 
work and livelihoods but also the very basic conditions of their own humanity, 
struggling to maintain a sense of self-worth and social value in relation to an 
economic realm being restructured to degrade, disempower and dispossess them. 
However, this has been largely neglected as social theorists proclaimed that ‘class was 
dead’. Instead, social theory was concerned with ‘other identities’ such as gender, 
race, ethnicity and sexual orientation which could not be understood through the 
spectrum of class-analysis as the latter was alleged to be the privilege of (stupid) 
white men and retarded Marxists.  Hence a representational realm was produced in 
relation to the needs and value of those instituting the field to value their own 
positionality and all that it was invested in, all it emerged from. Instead of 
understanding the transformation of modern industrial society as epochal and 
apocalyptic, social theorists started to indulge in analyses of consumerism, leisure, 
tourism, hedonism, ‘aestheticization’, ‘reflexivity’ etcetera. Even notions such as 
‘ontological insecurity’ and individualization which could potentially be useful in 
helping to explain the deep-rooted alienated character of social inequality in post-
industrial society were by and large wasted on universalising middle class experiences 
and their institutionally anchored privileges. 
 
Class itself has been turned into a representational phenomena, a memory in the 
pseudo-autobiographical ramblings of academics who try to justify their current status 
by pointing out where they came from (e.g. Kirk, 2004; Steedman 1987). However, 
there is hardly anything representational about the violence which underscores class-
relations in post-industrial neo-liberal economic social formations. This violence 
suddenly resurfaced on the flooded streets of New Orleans as the prevailing ‘social 
order’ broke down in the wake of what insurance companies prefer to label as ‘an act 
of God’. However, unlike media reports, we should not suddenly abandon our social-
theoretical frame of mind by describing this violence as ‘random’ or ‘senseless’.  
 
The idea that life outside the scope of view of middle class academia is meaningless is 
only the by-product of its relative neglect of everyday life at the ‘edge of civilization’. 
This is not just a North-American phenomenon. In Europe, especially in the UK, there 
are many areas in cities as well as so called ‘rural communities’ (e.g. former mining 
towns), where – upon entering on an ordinary day  - one feels to have entered highly 
marginalised social spaces. Drugs, alcohol, street violence are territorial markers of 
what can only be described as ‘apocalyptic’ social spaces of everyday life.  
 
There is nothing random or senseless about violence in post-apocalyptic settings 
because such violence is already experienced in the ordinary everydayness of people 
marked as ‘social exclusion’. It is the symbolic violence of that marking, with all its 
arbitriness that is institutionally naturalised in terms of pastoral power and the 
discourses of care and response, which have contributed to the reproduction of such 
social exclusion and the normalization of symbolic violence. People with little or no 
access to redefine the conditions of their own existence only have two options. They 
can either comply, and redefine themselves as in need of help, as victims of their own 
incompetence, or they can resist and reconfigure the meaningfulness of their lives in 
different terms, for example by accumulating different forms of social, economic and 
symbolic capital (e.g. upon which drugs-economies are often based) outside the realm 
of the formal economy and labour market. 
 
We posit that it is the latter which emerged in New Orleans as the dominant logic of a 
new post-apocalyptic social order. The challenge was directly aimed at the feeble 
means by which urbanised consumer capitalism attempted to secure itself. Having 
very little means to redistribute wealth, post-industrial, neo-liberal economic 
settlements are inherently vulnerable to opportunistic challenges anyway, and the 
socially excluded are perhaps the best adapted to do this. And this was not random. 
The primary targets where white, middle class tourists who – only a few days before – 
were clearly taking advantage of their dominant position in the globalised world 
order. However, when the hurricane struck, the spatial anchorage of global 
domination was blown apart, and a new spatial ordering emerged, one in which the 
local and local knowledge, provided for superior than the deterritorialised fluidity of 
global capital and tourism.  
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